SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - ELECT. FWR GENERFMEA NO 05-6MA-2032 -1 REV:01/03/90

ASSEMBLY : PANEL R12A1 CRIT. FUNC: P/N RI :ME452-01D2-7306 CRIT. HDW: 2

P/N VENDOR: VEHICLE 102 103 104 QUANTITY :1 EFFECTIVITY: Х X :ONE PHASE(S): PL LO. OO X DO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A APPROVED_BY: 🦽 APPROVED BY (NASA):

DES A BAIZ DES THE SSH Sec REL REL THE MAN CLAMA 14.90 T KIMURA REL PP 0E J COURSEN QΕ Mr. San San San QΕ

EPDC SEM BOLL

EPOC PEL COURS

ITEM:

SWITCH, TOGGLE, 3 POLE, 3 POSITION - FUEL CELL PURGE LINE HEATERS

FUNCTION:

PREPARED BY:

:

PROVIDES THE CREW WITH THE CAPABILITY TO INITIATE AUTOMATIC PURGE LINE HEATING IN CONJUNCTION WITH SWITCH \$1 BY SWITCHING TO "GPC" POSITION. PERFORM MANUAL HEATING BY SWITCHING TO THE "ON" POSITION OR SHUT OFF IN THE "OFF" POSITION. 32V73A12A1S2

FAILURE MODE:

FAILS OPEN

CAUSE(S):

PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PROCESSING ANOMALY

EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
- (A,B) LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER ANY FUEL CELL POWER PLANT (FCP) PURGE HEATERS. LOSS OF GPC AND MANUAL PURGE HEATER PRECLUDES FURTHER FCP PURGING AND WILL RESULT IN FCP OUTPUT SLOW DEGRADATION.
- (C) NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT AFTER LOSS OF PURGE HEATERS. POSSIBLE EARLY MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO FCP OUTPUT DEGRADATION.
- (D) NO EFFECT

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE

REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM NO. 1 - TOGGLE SWITCH

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- (B) TEST
 GROUND TURNAROUND TEST SWITCH OPERATION IS VERIFIED EVERY FIFTH
 TURNAROUND AND DURING IN-FLIGHT PURGE.
- (E) OPERATIONAL USE
 CREW MAY REDUCE FCP LOADS TO EXTEND FCP LIFETIME IF NECESSARY TO SUPPORT ENTRY AFTER FAILURE.